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1. Introduction 
The recent success of some alternative trading systems (ATSs) has had a strong impact on the 
traditional stock exchange industry and many observers expect even more dramatic changes in the 
future. This paper investigates the nature of competition between stock exchanges and ATSs and 
argues that the introduction of ATSs weakens the level of competition between market-makers in the 
traditional exchange.  
According to a popular argument, competing stock markets lead to a fragmentation of the market and 
a reduction of liquidity which in turn increases spreads and search costs for traders and threatens the 
efficiency of the overall price discovery process. However, this argument is valid only in a world with 
high information barriers. With functioning arbitrage links between markets the traditional 
fragmentation argument breaks down.  
This paper takes another view on stock market competition by looking in more detail at the different 
levels of competition. Stock markets offer a bundle of products and may best be described as a 
vertical production chain. The first element of the chain is the supply of immediacy by market-makers 
or individual traders. By providing privileges to certain members such as the specialists of the NYSE, 
the Nasdaq market-makers or the ￿Aktienbetreuer￿ on the German stock exchange, stock exchanges 
actively engage in the production of immediacy. The second element is the trading system. Different 
exchanges compete in technical dimensions such as speed, reliability and information services as well 
as in design dimensions such as the details of trading rules. The third element in the vertical 
production process is the settlement and clearing operation. Today, these functions may be provided 
by different entities. However, two of the three elements are often provided by one entity. For example, 
the German stock exchange is the owner of both the trading system and the clearing system. Another 
example is the in-house systems of banks that usually encompass the market-making function and the 
trading system function. Most European ATSs are at least partly owned by securities trading firms, 
indicating that the trading business may be more profitable if trading firms achieve control over trading 
systems. This paper concentrates on the relationship between trading systems on the one side and 
the business of making markets on the other side. The analysis shows that the two areas are 
interrelated. Changing the level of competition in the area of trading systems has an impact on the 
level of competition at the market-maker level.  
Although the seminal work on collusive behaviour by Nasdaq market-makers by Christie and Schultz 
(1994) has directed much attention to the issue of competition between market-makers, this issue has 
so far received little attention in the theoretical literature. The market microstructure literature usually 
assumes either perfect competition between market-makers or monopolistic market-makers. This 
strand of the literature is not suited to studying the determinants of the level of competition between 
market-makers. Kyle (1989) models imperfect competition between informed investors but does not 
focus on imperfect competition between market-makers.  
A paper by Dutta and Madhavan (1997) shows that implicit collusion between market-makers may 
occur when they compete by choosing intertemporal pricing strategies. The idea is that collusive 
equilibria may be sustainable if market-makers use tit-for-tat pricing strategies, ie penalising a 
deviation from the collusive equilibrium by quoting a low spread in later periods. However, collusion is 
only one out of many equilibria in their model. It is therefore difficult to draw conclusions on the impact 
of ATSs on the level of competition. In a different framework, Dennert (1993) shows that competition 
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between a limited number of market-makers does not eliminate their profits when they use linear price 
schedules. However, he does not investigate the relation between competing stock markets and the 
level of market-maker profits. Kandel and Marx (1997) show that a Bertrand equilibrium with spread 
exceeding marginal cost may result from fixed minimum price increments. However, this paper is also 
not concerned with the issue of competition between trading systems. In a recent contribution, 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) analyse the interaction of dealer markets and crossing networks. 
They show that the introduction of a crossing network may increase or decrease the equilibrium 
spread in the dealer market. However, their model assumes Bertrand competition between market-
makers which always ensures a zero profit equilibrium in which price equals average costs. 
This paper presents a new approach to modelling the price setting behaviour of market-makers within 
a simple one-period framework. The paper deviates from the usual notion of Bertrand competition by 
assuming that market-makers who do not quote the best bid and ask prices still receive some order 
volume. Unlike Dutta and Madhavan (1997), the approach yields unique equilibria with non-zero profits 
for market-makers and allows an analysis of the impact of ATSs on equilibrium spreads and 
equilibrium market-maker profits. 
Within the popular press, opposing views on the likely impact of ATSs on market spreads are 
expressed. Some commentators expect that increased competition among trading systems through 
the advent of ATSs would help to tighten spreads.
2 On the other hand, concerns have been raised that 
the vertical integration of trading services through the entry of bank-owned in-house trading systems 
will in the end lead to a monopolisation of the trading industry.
3 The European regulatory authorities 
currently follow a comparatively liberal policy and believe that a ￿laissez-faire￿ policy is best suited to 
promote competition among marketplaces and achieve economic efficiency. However, the European 
Commission has recently expressed concerns that the trend towards vertically integrated trading 
systems could dampen competition and is considering regulatory actions against vertical constraints in 
the stock exchange industry.
4 The model presented here elaborates this view by showing how vertical 
constraints in the form of order-preferencing arrangements between ATSs and market-makers may 
affect the level of competition between market-makers and increase the equilibrium spread in stock 
markets.  
2.  The regulatory situation 
The European securities markets are characterised by regulatory fragmentation. Stock market 
regulation in Europe is usually shaped by three different kinds of regulatory bodies:  
1.  Institutions regulating insider trading and the flow of information from companies to investors 
(insider regulation). 
2.  Institutions regulating the capital adequacy of participants in the trading process (capital 
adequacy regulation). 
3.  Institutions which regulate stock exchanges or oversee the self-regulatory bodies of stock 
exchanges (stock exchange regulation). 
As a new fourth body of regulation, one should mention the competition authorities, which have just 
recently begun to become interested in issues of stock market competition. 
Unlike the situation in the United States, the bodies regulating stock exchanges work on a 
decentralised basis. This approach is sometimes called the ￿silo approach￿ to regulation since every 
authority is concerned with only one or few stock exchanges. An extreme example is the situation in 
Germany, where the local states have the duty of overseeing stock exchanges. This led to the curious 
situation of a local state government having to approve the planned merger of the German stock 
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exchange with the London Stock Exchange - a decision which obviously affects the interests of much 
more people than the voters of the local state government.  
Due to the decentralised nature of competition, the regulatory actions concentrate on the business 
processes within the particular regulated stock exchange. The competition between different 
exchanges naturally lies beyond the horizon of decentralised authorities. In other words: no institution 
is responsible for providing a fair level playing field between competing stock exchanges. The relations 
between competing stock exchanges are beyond the scope of today￿s stock market regulation.
5   
Regulatory councils such as the Federation of European Securities Commissions (2000), or the 
German Stock Exchange Council (2001) discuss at length the extent to which principles of stock 
market regulation should be applied to ATSs but are silent on the regulation of competition between 
trading systems. The discussion is mainly concerned with the threats to market integrity and systemic 
risk posed by the new trading platforms. There is little or no discussion on an economic role of 
protecting new trading platforms against the dominant incumbent exchanges or vice versa.  
The issue of competition between trading systems requires a broader scope of regulation than 
currently practised. In particular, it raises the question of external effects in other areas as the current 
focus of the various regulators￿ investigations. This paper highlights one of possibly many external 
effects of trading system competition: a weakening of market-making competition. Although the 
conclusion will show that it is hard to draw clear regulatory implications from the analysis, some blind 
spots in the current regulatory landscape are identified by the analysis.  
3.   The impact of alternative trading systems on market-maker competition 
The following model tries to explore the effect of introducing an ATS on the competition between 
market-makers. It is a very simplified and stylised, based on the following assumptions: 
1.  The market consists of two types of individuals: traders and market-makers. There is no 
asymmetric information about the value of stocks. All traders are thus liquidity traders.    
2.  Initially, stocks are traded in a pure dealer market (the incumbent market), in which two 
market-makers compete for order flow. Both market-makers simultaneously choose bid and 
ask quotes and commit to execute an unlimited order volume at this price. 
3.  Market-makers act as Bertrand competitors in the incumbent market, ie their action variable 
is the quoted spread. The market is in equilibrium when no market-maker wants to alter his 
own spread given the spread of his competitor.  
4.  When an ATS is introduced, every trader chooses one particular trading platform before he 
places his order.  
5.  In order to attract order volume, the ATS provides a best price guarantee, ie traders receive 
the same transaction price on both markets and thus are indifferent between both markets.  
6.  Traders cannot place limit orders within the spread on either the dealer market or the ATS. 
7.  Before the start of trading, a contract is signed between the ATSs and the market-makers 
which commits both market-makers to assume and execute all orders routed through the 
ATSs. For simplicity, we assume an equal division of the trading volume between both 
market-makers.
6 Note that the contractual allocation of the ATS￿s order flow to the individual 
market-makers takes place before the orders are placed by traders. It is this sequence of 
events which drives the main results of the model. By committing to buy a portion of the 
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ATS￿s order flow before trading in the incumbent market takes place, the market-makers are 
able to precommit to pursue a less competitive pricing behaviour in the latter trading session. 
Intuitively, following aggressive pricing strategies in the incumbent market becomes less 
attractive because lowering the spread, ceteris paribus, leads to a smaller increase in 
volume as compared to the situation without the ATSs.   
8.  Market-makers￿ cost function is linear in turnover. The constant marginal cost may be 
interpreted as order-handling costs following the usual microstructure literature.  
9.  For simplicity, transaction costs are assumed to be zero for both markets.  
10.  In an important deviation from the usual Bertrand model, we assume that a market-maker 
quoting a lower spread does not lose all trading volume. 
In traditional market microstructure models, the market-maker quoting the best bid or ask price attracts 
all trading volume. This assumption has the consequence that Bertrand competition drives down the 
spread until the spread equals marginal cost. A market spread exceeding the market-makers￿ marginal 
cost cannot be an equilibrium because every market-maker would have an incentive to slightly 
undercut his competitor(s). He loses little in terms of the spread reduction but gains a lot in terms of 
order volume because he is able to attract 100% of the trading volume. It follows that the only 
equilibrium is a symmetric equilibrium in which all market-makers set the same spread equal to 
marginal cost.  
This extreme reaction of trading volume is unlikely to be a good description of real world markets. 
Although price priority rules ensure that limit orders with better prices are served before any other 
order with worse prices at any point in time, strict price priority is not a good market description when 
we are concerned about modelling spread setting strategies over somewhat longer time intervals. 
Suppose a market-maker is an employee of a securities trading firm and gets the order to follow a 
particular spread setting strategy, ie he will keep a spread of 100 base points. Suppose another 
market-maker working for another securities firm has an order to quote a 101 base point spread. 
Standard theory predicts that the second market-maker will not be able to do a single transaction. 
However, he can expect a non-zero turnover in real world markets for a number of reasons not 
acknowledged by the standard theory: 
 At any specific point in time, competing market-makers may post different bid and ask quotes 
because of differences in their current inventory positions. 
 Both market-makers may quote different bid and ask prices as they have different 
expectations about the fair (mid-market) value of the asset traded.  
 After a transaction has erased an order from the order book, the market-maker will need some 
time to place a new quote there. Within this short time period, another market-maker, who is 
quoting a higher spread, may attract trading volume.  
 Every market-maker must continuously update his bid and ask quote in order to adjust to 
changing market prices. If this adjustment does not take place exactly simultaneously, a 
market-maker with a higher spread will at some points in time quote the best bid or ask quote.  
All these arguments support the view that the reaction of transaction volume to spread changes is less 
extreme in real world markets as compared with the usual Bertrand models. A good model of market-
maker competition should have the property that expected trading volume is a smooth and decreasing 
function of the quoted spread, ie a market-maker quoting aggressively receives more, but not all 
trading volume.  
In order to formalise this idea, assume that aggregate demand for dealer services is inelastic such that 
the aggregate trading volume is given by a constant X. Furthermore, the share of trading volume that a 
market-maker attracts is a smooth function of his own spread and the spread quoted by his 
competitor. For simplicity, assume that the fraction of trading volume attracted by each market-maker 
xi is a linear function of the spreads si and sj quoted by each market-maker: 
xi = ‰ - si + sj 
When both market-makers set the same spread, they both receive 50% of the trading volume. If one of 
the market-makers lowers his spread, he is gaining market share but not the complete market and vice 
versa. Note that xi and xj sum up to one.  BIS Papers No 7  57
 
Finally, the cost function of market-makers is assumed to be linear with constant marginal cost of c per 
unit of trade. Each trader sets the profit maximising spread given the spread set by his competitor. We 
are interested in the equilibrium spreads of this Bertrand competition for order flow. 
The profits of trader i given the spread chosen by trader j, is given by 
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The market-maker sets the profit maximising spread. The first order condition is 
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The two first order conditions of the market-makers define the two reaction functions of the game: 
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The symmetric equilibrium is given by the intersection of the reaction functions. In equilibrium, the 
spread exceeds marginal cost: 
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Equilibrium profit for each market-maker is given by 
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Bertrand competition in this setting does not erase market-maker profits. Due to the assumed market 
imperfections, market-makers are able to realise a profit margin in equilibrium. 
Now, suppose that an ATS is introduced into this setting. The ATS convinces a fraction α of traders to 
direct their trades away from the incumbent market. It offers a best price guarantee stating that the 
trader pays the same spread as he would have received in the incumbent market. Due to the best 
price guarantee, traders are indifferent between both markets. The ATS then signs a contract with 
both market-makers in order to ensure the promised order execution. For simplicity, assume that the 
ATS charges the market-makers no fees for the right to execute the ATS￿s orders. This implies that 
any rents earned in the trading business stay with the market-markers and are not appropriated by the 
ATS. For simplicity, we assume a symmetric setting, ie both market-makers contract for half of the 
order volume generated by the ATS. Each market-maker￿s profit now has two components: the profits 
earned in the incumbent market and the profits earned on the contracted ATS￿s order flow. The profit 
earned on the ATS￿s orders depends on the benchmark price from the best price guarantee. When the 
two market-makers quote different prices, the derivation of the benchmark price is not trivial. We 
assume that the best price guarantee has the purpose of making traders indifferent between both 
markets. In order to ensure indifference, the benchmark price must be equated to the expected spread 
that the trader pays in the incumbent market. The benchmark price will be either si or sj, depending on 
whether trader i or trader j is setting the spread at the moment when a liquidity trader enters his trade. 
Since both cases happen with probabilities xi and xj, we can compute the expected spread on ATS￿s 
orders earned by the market-makers:  58  BIS Papers No 7
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After the ATSs has been founded and the order flow has been contracted, the trading session starts 
and each trader again has to set a profit maximising spread. When setting their spread, the profit 
function of market-makers has changed as compared to the situation without an ATS for two reasons: 
they compete only for the remaining fraction of overall trading demand (1-α)X and when setting a 
price, they have to take into account the effect on the benchmark spread on the precontracted ATSs 
trading volume. The new profit function is: 
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The first order condition after introduction of the ATSs becomes: 
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Solving for the new equilibrium as above, we find the new equilibrium spread: 
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For the special case α = 0 (no trading volume contracted to the ATS), the equilibrium spread coincides 
with the above result for the market without ATSs. For positive α, the spread increases and is a 
monotonic function of α. Thus, market-makers are able to raise their spread in equilibrium due to the 
existence of an ATS with best price guarantee. The effect of introducing an ATS into the dealer market 
is a reduction of the level of competitiveness. The ATS allows market-makers to quote spreads which 
are closer to the monopoly situation. (As α approaches 1, the spread grows without bound. This result 
is due to the assumed inelastic demand for market-maker services which enables a monopolistic 
market-maker to demand an arbitrarily high spread.) 
While the model is highly stylised and simple, the basic intuition for the spread increase after 
introducing an ATS is straightforward and continues to hold in many possible extensions of the model. 
When a trader calculates the marginal gain of lowering the spread in a situation without an ATS, he 
has to consider three effects. First, he earns a lower profit margin on his trading volume. Second, he 
enjoys an increase of trading volume because he attracts a larger market share. Third, he has to take 
into account the reaction of his competitor. Since the reaction functions have a positive slope, the 
competitor will also decrease his spread, resulting in a decline of trading volume. After the introduction 
of an ATS, the situation changes. Concerning the trading volume left in the dealer market, the same 
effects are present. However, the trader now has to take into account the additional effect on profits 
from his ATS￿s trading volume. Since the volume has been contracted in advance, there is only the 
price effect left: lowering the spread thus unambiguously decreases the profits from the ATS. The fact 
that he cannot gain more market share in the ATS￿s market makes a reduction of spreads less 
favourable ceteris paribus. In other words: the ATS serves as a precommitment device which weakens 
price competition in the later trading stage by lowering the returns from decreasing the spread. 
Note that the model has a unique equilibrium that allows a clear-cut analysis of the effect of 
introducing an ATS. In a related model, Dutta and Madhavan (1997) show that order-preferencing 
arrangements increase the potential gains from collusion for individual market-makers. But their model 
has multiple equilibria and collusion is just one of them. Their model is also consistent with the 
empirical hypothesis that ATSs do not have any impact on the spread. Kandel and Marx (1997) also 
analyse the impact of order-preferencing arrangements within their model, which is qualitatively 
equivalent to introducing an ATS. They conclude that order-preferencing does not change the spread 
as long as the marginal market-maker has no preferenced orders. This result does not continue to BIS Papers No 7  59
 
hold in the context of our model. Even if only one market-maker receives all ATS trading volume, the 
equilibrium spread in the market would increase as one of the two reaction functions shift. The result 
of Kandel and Marx depends on the usual Bertrand assumptions and therefore has little robustness 
when the individual demand curves become downward-sloping and smooth as assumed here. 
4. Conclusion 
As we have demonstrated, the introduction of alternative trading systems may have the undesired side 
effect of decreasing competition at the market-making level when ATSs use best price guarantees in 
conjunction with order-preferencing arrangements as often seen in European securities markets these 
days. If regulators try to intensify trading system competition by recognising or promoting ATSs, they 
may have to trade off the efficiency gains through intensified competition at the trading system level 
with a decrease of competition at the market-making level. If one tries to compare both effects in terms 
of practical importance, there is a clear indication that market-maker competition should be much more 
important than trading system competition: commissions for using a trading system are an order of 
magnitude lower than the bid-ask spread in most markets.  
This poses the question of the raison d￿Œtre of ATSs: do these systems exist because they can 
successfully compete against inefficient and costly trading systems of traditional exchanges? Or are 
they better described as vehicles to increase market-maker profits by limiting the ex post competition 
for orders by using order-preferencing arrangements? The model outlined here suggests that the 
second motive may be a valid reason for founding ATSs. This view is supported by the fact that the 
owners of ATSs are almost always securities trading firms or banks actively engaged in securities 
trading. In conversations, some representatives of European ATSs openly admitted that the spread 
income made by selling the order flow to securities firms is much more important than economies 
realised in operating a cost-efficient trading system.  
If the second motive of operating ATSs should be the dominant one, it is still an open question 
whether customers are worse off after introduction of an ATS and whether regulators should intervene 
in the competition between traditional exchanges and ATSs. As long as there is free entry into the 
market-making industry, any profits made on order-preferencing arrangements with ATSs should be 
competed away, presumably by the usual practice of paying the ATSs for the access to their order 
flow. Competition between market-makers should therefore ensure that profits are passed over to the 
operators of ATSs. However, there is competition between ATSs for customer order flow. This 
competition will ensure that the payments received by market-makers are passed over to brokers and 
finally reduce the commissions paid by customers for trading stocks. If one follows this view, the gains 
from monopolisation of the market-making process are passed back to the customer and help to lower 
the fixed transaction costs of placing orders. 
Two final remarks on this chain of reasoning are in order. First, it is questionable whether competition 
on all levels works smoothly and ensures that the extra fee paid by customers for market-making 
services will in the end flow back to them in the form of lower brokerage costs. Frictions and rigidities 
in the vertical chain may well leave part of the rents within the securities industry. Second and more 
important, the argument highlights the importance of understanding the multidimensional nature of 
transaction costs paid for securities trading services. The overall cost of trading includes brokerage 
fees, fees and commissions for settlement and related services and finally the spread paid to market-
makers. While fees are an obvious and transparent cost of transacting, many investors have only a 
limited understanding of the amount of money they pay for market-making services in the form of the 
bid-ask spread. The shift of trading volume away from traditional exchanges towards ATSs may result 
in a general shift of transaction costs away from transparent items such as brokerage fees towards 
non-transparent items such as the spread. Future regulation should ensure that customers have 
access to all necessary information in order to make an informed decision between trading systems.   60  BIS Papers No 7
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